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THE ROLE OF ETHICS AND UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OPINIONS IN REGULATING THE
PRACTICE OF LAW IN KENTUCKY
BY WILLIAM H. FORTUNE'
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to discuss the role of ethics and
unauthorized practice opinions in regulating the practice of law,
with suggestions for clarification and improvement.
The Kentucky Bench and Bar, the quarterly journal of the
Kentucky Bar Association ("KBA"), prints "Advisory Ethics
Opinions" and "Unauthorized Practice Opinions" over the
signatures of the respective chairs of the Ethics and Unauthorized
Practice of Law ("UPL") Committees. This article describes: 1)
how ethics and unauthorized practice opinions are generated; 2)
the legal effect of the opinions; 3) the relationship of ethics
opinions to attorney discipline; 4) the Board of Bar Governors' role
in shaping the opinions; and 5) the role of the Kentucky Supreme
Court. The article concludes by suggesting that the Kentucky
Supreme Court appoint the members of the Ethics and UPL
Committees and that the court have the power to review opinions
on the court's own motion.
1. Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. Member of the committee that drafted
Kentucky's Rules of Professional Conduct, member of the Kentucky Bar Association
Ethics Committee. Thanks to Sheldon Gilman, of Lynch, Cox, Gilman and Mahan in
Louisville, and to Richard Underwood, Professor of Law at the University of Kentucky for
their comments on this article. Mr. Gilman and Professor Underwood have served the
bar and the Commonwealth admirably as member and chair, respectively, of the KBA
Ethics Committee. Professor Underwood and I have worked on a number of projects over
the years, notably on books we have co-authored (Trial Ethics (1988) and Modern
Litigation and Professional Responsibility Handbook (1996)). He is a wise counselor and.
an excellent colleague. I am responsible for the wording of some of the opinions criticized
in this article, notably E-382 (note 95).
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I. HOW OPINIONS ARE GENERATED AND THEIR LEGAL
EFFECT
Section 116 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that "the
Supreme Court shall, by rule, govern admission to the bar and
the discipline of members of the bar."2 The KBA helps the court
admit, educate, and discipline Kentucky attorneys. The KBA,
through its Board of Governors, executive director, bar counsel,
and membership, functions as the court's agent in these
matters.3
Supreme Court Rule 3.530,4 one of the rules adopted by the
court pursuant to Section 116, furthers the educational mission
of the court and bar by providing that an attorney may ask a
member of the Ethics Committee (a "hot-line" member) for ad-
vice about the ethical propriety of contemplated conduct.5 The
requesting attorney is protected from discipline if the attorney
follows the advice of the hot-line member (and if the attorney's
portrayal of the problem is complete and accurate).6
Hot-line members refer questions to the Ethics Committee
when they are unsure of the correct answer, or feel that the
question is one that needs to be answered for the benefit of the
entire bar - i.e., by a formal opinion. In addition, local bar
associations may ask the Committee for advisory opinions.
Matters which seem to be of general importance are discussed at
meetings of the Ethics Committee and formal opinions are
prepared for consideration by the Board of Governors. The Board
can approve, modify, or disapprove Ethics Committee opinions. In
addition, the Board can approve the opinion but direct that it be
issued to the requesting attorney as an informal (i.e. private)
opinion. 7 The UPL Committee functions in the same way as the
Ethics Committee, except that most of the questions are posed by
local bar associations concerned about non-lawyers practicing law.
The UPL Committee takes unauthorized practice questions which
come to the Ethics Committee through its hot-line members. Like
ethics opinions, unauthorized practice opinions are referred to the
2. KY. CONST. § 116 (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
3. Ex Parte Auditor of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682, 689 (Ky. 1980).
4. Ky. SUP. Cr. R. 3.530 (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
5. Ky. Sup. CT. R. 3.530(1) (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
6. Ky. SUP. CT. R. 3.530(3) (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
7. Ky. Sup. Ct. R. 3.530(2) (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
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Board of Governors, which has the final say on whether, and in
what form, opinions are released.
Formal ethics and unauthorized practice opinions approved by
the Board of Governors are published - in full or in synopsis form
- in the Kentucky Bench and Bar, the publication of the KBA.8
The publication does not reflect the supervisory role of the Board
of Governors. Ethics and unauthorized practice opinions are not
published in the Southwestern Reporter or in the annotations to
the Kentucky Revised Statutes. The opinions in the Bench and
Bar are not indexed.9
The governing rule states that ethics and unauthorized
practice opinions are advisory only. 10 They do not have the force of
law and lawyers are not obligated to follow them. However, the
rule provides for review of an opinion by the Supreme Court of
Kentucky upon petition by any person or entity "aggrieved or
affected" thereby,1' a provision which appears to acknowledge that
ethics and UPL opinions, though advisory, might affect a person or
entity adversely. In American Insurance Association v. Kentucky
Bar Association,12 for example, the insurance industry sought
review of Ethics Opinion E-368 and Unauthorized Practice
Opinion U-36.13 In E-368,14 the Ethics Committee and Board of
Governors stated that a lawyer may not enter into a contract with
a liability insurer in which the lawyer or his firm agrees to do all of
the insurer's defense work for a set fee. 15 The insurance industry
obviously believed that after E-368 attorneys would claim they
could not ethically work on a set fee basis, would insist on being
paid by the hour, and pad their bills. Thus, the net effect would be
higher defense costs and. reduced profits for the industry. The
industry challenged E-368 by filing an appeal with the Kentucky
Supreme Court within thirty days after the opinion was published
8. Ky. Sup. CT. R. 3.530(4) (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
9. Opinions issued prior to 1993 (through E-358 and U-45) are compiled and indexed
in UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY COLLEGE OF LAW, OFFICE OF CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION, KENTUCKY LEGAL ETHICS OPINIONS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DESKBOOK (Richard Underwood, ed. 1993) (hereinafter "DESKBOOK"). References to
ethics and unauthorized practice opinions before 1993 will be to the DESHBOOK.
10. Ky. Sup. Or. R. 3.530(3) (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
11. Ky. SuP. Or. R. 3.530(5) (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
12. 917 S.W.2d 568 (Ky. 1996).
13. Id.
14. Advisoty Ethics Opinion E-368, 58 KY. BENCH & B. 52 (Fall 1994).
15. Id.
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in the Kentucky Bench and Bar.
The industry also challenged U-36,16 a 1982 unauthorized
practice opinion stating that an insurance company may not use
house counsel (salaried employees) to represent its insureds once
suit is filed.17 U-36 had relied on definitive statements by the
Kentucky high court that a corporation cannot legally practice
law. 18 The industry had complied with the mandate of the cases
relied on in U-36 and hired outside counsel to represent its
insureds after suit was filed. By challenging U-36 in the American
Insurance case, the industry gave the Kentucky court an
opportunity to take another look at the issue.
Unfortunately for the insurance industry, the Kentucky
Supreme Court affirmed both U-36 and E-368.19 With regard to
U-36, the court rejected cases from other jurisdictions and
approved the result in U-36, though primarily on grounds of
conflict rather than unauthorized practice. 20 In the view of the
court, house counsel might be conflicted by representation of an
insured after suit is filed.21 "[A]s a prophylactic measure not
unlike the imputed disqualification rules," the court held that such
representation is prohibited.22
With regard to E-368, the court opined that set fee
arrangements between attorneys and liability insurers create
impermissible conflicts with insureds (who are the attorneys'
"clients").23 While noting nineteen potential conflicts between
insured and insurer,24 the court seemed most concerned with the
fact that attorneys might face financial loss in time-consuming
cases, which might cause the attorneys to provide inadequate
representation of the insureds. 25 However, the court did not
explain how an insured might be harmed by inadequate
16. U-36 (1982), DESKBOOK, supra note 9, at 36.
17. Id. U-36 approved in-house representation of the insured's interest before suit is
filed. Id.
18. Frazee v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 393 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1965); Hobson
v. Kentucky Trust Co. of Louisville, 197 S.W.2d 454 (Ky. 1946); Kendall v. Beiling, 175
S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1943).
19. American Ins., 917 S.W.2d at 574.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 571.
23. Id. at 573.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 572.
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representation, since the insurer pays the claim.
While the logic of American Insurance is debatable, there is no
question but that E-368 is now the law of the Commonwealth.
What had been merely advisory became a legal mandate. Even
before affirmance, however, E-368 likely had inhibited attorneys
otherwise willing to handle defense work on a set fee basis, and
thereby affected the insurance industry.
II. WHAT LEGAL SCHOLARS HAVE SAID ABOUT ETHICS
COMMITTEES AND THEIR OPINIONS
In 1982 Professors Finman and Schneyer evaluated the work
of the American Bar Association's Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility ("CEPR").26 By their standards CEPR
failed miserably. They examined the twenty-one formal opinions
issued by CEPR since the adoption of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; the twenty-one opinions contained forty-eight
holdings.27  They graded the holdings by two criteria:
"correctness" (i.e., is the holding logical and is it based on a value
judgment likely to be accepted?), and "reasoning. '28  They
considered the attributes of good reasoning to be: 1) identification
of a tenable rule-based rationale, 2) identification of relevant
authorities, 3) identification of problems of interpretive choice, 4)
careful analysis of problems of interpretive choice, and 5) clarity.29
According to Finman and Schneyer, only twenty-one of CEPR's
forty-eight holdings were correct, and fourteen of the twenty-one
correct holdings added nothing to conclusions that lawyers would
draw on their own from reading the Code. 30 By their analysis,
CEPR's reasoning fared even worse. "[E]ight opinions fail to
identify a tenable rationale; eleven opinions fail to identify
relevant authority; thirteen overlook problems of interpretive
choice; eight fail to analyze such problems adequately; and many
opinions suffer from serious ambiguity."31
26. Ted Finman & Theodore Schneyer, The Role of Bar Associations in Regulating
Lawyer Conduct: A Critique of the Work of the ABA Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 67 (1981).
27. Id. at 95.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 97-98.
31. Id. at 114.
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After dissecting each of CEPR's twenty-one opinions and
exposing the shallow and illogical reasoning therein,3 2 the authors
advanced their solution: to make the process adversarial by
appointing lawyers to research and argue contrary positions on the
questions before the Committee. 33
Charles Wolfram wrote the "book" on ethics and professional
responsibility, and he found little good to say about ethics
opinions.3 4 According to Wolfram, the influence of ethics opinions
has waned. Courts rarely rely on them, and they are often
dogmatic, poorly reasoned, and badly written.3 5 In generalizing
about ethics committees and their work, Wolfram focused on ABA
opinions and tracked Finman and Schneyer's critical analysis of
those opinions.3 6
In 1991 Professor Richard Underwood, chair of the Ethics
Committee of the Kentucky Bar Association, deflected the
criticism of Finman, Schneyer and Wolfram by focusing on the role
of ethics committees in issuing private opinions to requesting
lawyers.3 7 Underwood pointed out that ethics committees are not
courts and do not decide cases; thus, analogies to judicial systems
are not well-taken. 38
If there is one point to be made in responding to critics of
ethics committees ... it is that complex advocacy models
complete with "the usual" appellate review are fiscally
profligate and delay creating, and may defeat the very
purpose of having bar sponsored committees and "hot-
lines." As a prime corollary, I would suggest that a cult of
precedent and methodology of priestly casuistry are
likewise undesirable. The ethics rules can and should be
applied as rules of reason.39
According to Underwood, the principal value of an ethics
committee is to keep the honest practitioner on track.40 A practi-
32. Id. at 163-66 (according to Finman and Schneyer).
33. Id.
34. CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS (1986).
35. Id. at 65-66.
36. Id. at 66 n.14.
37. Richard Underwood, Confessions of an Ethics Chairman, 16 J. LEGAL PROF. 125,
131-39 (1991).
38. Id. at 149.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 150.
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tioner, unsure of the propriety of anticipated conduct, can obtain
an advisory opinion which, if followed, will protect him from dis-
cipline. The practitioner is thus kept on the right track and the
public well served.
Underwood did not focus on the role of formal opinions, other
than to say that they serve the purpose of educating the bar,
"lassuming that lawyers will read them."41
In a 1992 article, Professor Jorge Carro studied the impact of
ethics opinions on judicial decisions. 42 By computerized search he
found 1194 opinions cited in 639 state and federal cases between
1924 and 1990.43 He found ethics opinions cited in a variety of
contexts, most often in cases dealing with conflict of interest.44
Not surprisingly, he concluded that ABA formal opinions are more
influential than state opinions.45 He found that some state courts
(New York for example) cite ethics opinions frequently, while other
state courts (California for example) rarely do so. 46 Contrary to
Wolfram's dismissive analysis, Carro concluded that courts treat
ethics opinions with deference, almost as if they were judicial
opinions.47
The courts treat these opinions with great deference, and,
in fact, attribute to them a degree of attention similar to
that usually found in the treatment of judicial opinions. In
discussing the ethics opinions of the bar, courts follow,
distinguish, criticize, parallel, and harmonize them just as
courts do with judicial opinions.48
However, Carro agreed with Finman and Schneyer that ethics
opinions are not always well-reasoned and well-written. While not
advocating Finman and Schneyer's adversarial solution, Carro
urged ethics committees to recognize their impact on judges and
lawyers and to strive to improve the quality of formal opinions. 49
William Hunt, then disciplinary counsel for the Tennessee
41. Id.
42. Jorge Carro, The Ethics Opinions of the Bar: A Valuable Contribution or an
Exercise in Futility?, 26 IND. L. REV. 1 (1992).
43. Id. at 16-17.
44. Id. at 22.
45. Id. at 23-26.
46. Id. at 38-39 (New York courts cited ethics opinions 73 times during the study
period; California courts only 11 times). Id.
47. Id. at 35.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 36.
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Board of Professional Responsibility, analyzed Tennessee ethics
opinions issued between 1980 and 1988.50 In Tennessee, formal
opinions are issued by ethics committees of the Board of
Professional Responsibility, the body charged with disciplining
attorneys. The members of the board are appointed by the
Tennessee Supreme Court and the board operates as an arm of the
court.51 The rule refers to the board as the Supreme Court Board
of Professional Responsibility and to the ethics committees as the
Supreme Court Ethics Committees. 52 The committees are
empowered to issue formal opinions which "shall bind the
Committee, the person requesting, and the Supreme Court Board
of Professional Responsibility, and shall constitute a body of
principles and objectives upon which members of the bar can
rely."53
Thus, the ethics committees function as an arm of the supreme
court, rather than the Tennessee Bar Association. While the
opinions are not binding on courts, 54 two factors give the opinions
more significance than opinions issued by a bar committee: the
close relationship between the board and the Tennessee Supreme
Court and the fact that the board is charged with both discipline
and the issuance of ethics opinions. 55 The official status of
Tennessee opinions may be to cause them to be treated as one
would treat regulations of an administrative agency - as binding
until successfully challenged. The disciplinary counsel's
description of the opinions uses language one would associate with
legal rules.56 After describing the 100 plus opinions as if they were
a body of law, he concludes by saying that a "significant body of
precedent has already been created to guide Tennessee
50. William Hunt, An Overview of Formal Ethics Opinions in Tennessee, 1980-88, 19
MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 275 (1989).
51. Id.
52. TENN. Sup. CT. R. 9, sec. 26.5(a) (1996) (there are three ethics committees, one for
each geographical area of the state).
53. Id.
54. State v. Jones, 726 S.W.2d 515, 519 (Tenn. 1987).
55. Carro, supra note 42, at 9.
56. E.g., Hunt, supra note 50, at 307 ('The Board later applied this reasoning to bar
an attorney from representing a client in a case contesting a will that he had signed as a
witness."); id. at 311 C'In its next opinion on this issue, the Board required attorneys to
comply with a 'Kentucky' rule in addition to the aforementioned 'New Jersey' rule); id. at
313 ('[T]he Board later found that a juvenile court judge was unable in his part-time





According to Professors Little and Rush, the close relationship
between the Tennessee board and the Tennessee Supreme Court
might serve to shield the board from liability for anti-trust
violations.58 The "state action" exemption59 from the Sherman Act
requires the challenged restraint to be both clearly articulated as
state policy and actively supervised by the state.60 Since some
state ethics and unauthorized practice opinions might be regarded
as anti-competitive, 61 it is important to shield the issuing body
from anti-trust liability.
III. DUE PROCESS IN THE DISCIPLINARY PROCESS
Attorneys are entitled to know what they may be disciplined
for. They should not have to guess what a disciplinary committee
or court might find to be "conduct tending to bring the bench and
bar into disrepute,"62 or have the "appearance of impropriety. '" 68
While it is probably true that rules for attorneys cannot be
drafted with the precision of criminal codes, 64 vague rules should
be avoided if possible and attorneys who attempt to follow the
rules should have safe passage in the disciplinary process.
In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,65 the United States Supreme
Court set aside a state disciplinary action on due process grounds,
holding that the attorney had been led by the "safe harbor"
provision of Nevada Supreme Court Rule 17766 to believe that his
57. Id. at 325.
58. Joseph Little & Randolph Rush, Resolving the Conflict between Professional Ethics
Opinions and Antitrust Laws, 15 GA. L. REV. 341 (1981).
59. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
60. California Retail Liquor Dealer's Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980).
61. See discussion infra note 148.
62. This was the standard in former Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 3.140 (now
changed); see Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Vincent, 537 S.W.2d 171 (Ky. 1976) for a
defense of this vague standard.
63. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1986) (replaced by the
Rules of Professional Conduct in 1990). The "appearance of impropriety" standard has
resurfaced. See Lovell v. Winchester, 941 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1997). See discussion infra
note 80.
64. Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n v.
Durham, 279 N.W.2d 280, 283-84 (Iowa 1979) (stating that it is impossible to draft a set
of rules covering all professional activity warranting discipline).
65. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
66. NEV. Sup. CT. R. 177 (1997) (substantially the same as Kentucky Rule of
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description of his defense in a criminal case67 to the media was
permitted by the rules of conduct.68 The Court held that the safe
harbor provision, as interpreted by the Nevada Supreme Court,
was void for vagueness because it did not give fair notice of what
was permitted and what was prohibited.69
Gentile stands broadly for the proposition that attorneys are
entitled to fair notice of what they may be disciplined for.
Attorneys are entitled to assume that the "disciplinary code"
consists of Supreme Court rules, which include the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct,70 and decisions of the Kentucky Supreme
Court interpreting the rules.
In a variety of contexts, the Kentucky Supreme Court opines
on attorneys' ethics.71 If the context is disciplinary, the court ap-
plies specific rules of conduct. 72 In one instance, however the
court, perhaps inadvertently, has violated this principle by relying
on a rule which does not impose a duty. Rule 1.4 says that an
attorney should keep a client reasonably informed, and should
explain matters to a client to enable the client to make reasonable
decisions. 73 The Model Rules Committee made Rule 1.4 non-
mandatory out of concern that failure to communicate was too
vague to serve as a basis for discipline. 74 Other rules, except Rule
6.2,75 use the mandatory "shall" or "shall not." In spite of the non-
mandatory nature of Rule 1.4, the court often cites the rule as one
Professional Conduct 3.6).
67. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (stating that the police, rather than his client, had stolen
money and drugs from a storage facility).
68. Id. at 1049-53; see also William Fortune et al., MODERN LITIGATION AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HANDBOOK: THE LIMITS OF ZEALOUS ADVOCACY, 383
(1996) (hereinafter "HANDBOOK").
69. Id. at 1048.
70. The Model Rules are subsections of Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 3.130.
71. E.g. Lovell v. Winchester, 941 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1997) (disqualification); Whitaker
v. Commonwealth, 895 S.W.2d 953 (Ky. 1995) (criminal appeal); Hubble v. Johnson, 841
S.W.2d 169 (Ky. 1992) (fee dispute).
72. But see Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Vincent, 537 S.W.2d 171, 173 (Ky. 1976)
(disciplining an attorney for "bringing the bench and bar into disrepute," and defending
that vague standard. The attorney had been convicted of failure to file income tax
returns, which he argued was not a crime of moral turpitude. The bench-and-bar-into-
disrepute rule, Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 3.140, has been repealed).
73. Ky. SuP. CT. R. 3.130(1.4) (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
74. The author served on the Model Rules Committee.
75. Ky. Sup. CT. R. 3.130(6.2) (stating "A lawyer should not seek to avoid appointment
by a tribunal except for good cause.")
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of the bases for discipline.76 With one exception, 77 however, the
court has relied on other rules, in addition to Rule 1.4, in
disciplining attorneys. The references to Rule 1.4 in those cases
might, therefore, be considered "harmless error." However, the
court should quit referring to Rule 1.4 as if the verb form was
"shall."
In non-disciplinary contexts the court is not confined by the
rules of conduct. The court may draw on general principles to
decide the case at bar, and in so doing, establish and modify legal
relationships between attorneys and other persons.78
Unfortunately, in two recent conflicts cases, the court deliberately
resurrected the discredited phrase "appearance of impropriety" as
a yardstick by which to judge attorneys' behavior in conflict of
interest cases. The first was the. American Insurance case, in
which Justice Stumbo justified the affirmance of E-368 by saying,
"[w]e dispose of these arguments by first stressing that the mere
appearance of impropriety is just as egregious as any actual or real
conflict. ' 79
The second case was Lovell v. Winchester,80 a mandamus
action to require the trial court to disqualify an attorney who
allegedly had obtained confidential information from a prospective
client, rejected the case, and then represented the client's
opponent.8' The court held that the attorney must be
disqualified. 2 The result is not surprising and could have been
reached by simply relying on Rule 1.9.83 However, the court went
out of its way to embrace the "appearance of impropriety"
standard:
Even though the comment to Rule 1.9 specifically rejects
the "appearance of impropriety" standard in favor of a fact-
based test applied to determine whether the lawyer's duty
76. E.g. Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Hatcher, 929 S.W.2d 193 (Ky. 1996); Monroe v.
Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 927 S.W.2d 839 (Ky. 1996); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Thomas, 927
S.W.2d 838 (Ky. 1996).
77. Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Davenport, 855 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1993).
78. E.g. Clark v. Burden, 917 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1996) (stating that the doctrine of
apparent authority does not ordinarily vest an attorney with authority to settle a client's
case).
79. American Ins. Ass'n v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 917 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Ky. 1996).
80. 941 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1997).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 469.
83. Ky. Sup. CT. R. 3.130(1.9) (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
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of loyalty and confidentiality to a former client will likely be
compromised by the subsequent representation, the
appearance of impropriety is still a useful guide for ethical
decisions. . . For these reasons, courts still retain the
appearance of impropriety standard as an independent
basis of assessment.8 4
To this point, the court has not disciplined a lawyer because the
lawyer's conduct gave the appearance of impropriety.8 5 It would
violate due process to rest discipline on such a vague standard.
However, now that it is clear that the court is concerned with
appearances, lawyers might assume they can be disciplined for
conduct which violates no rule but does not "pass the smell test."
If so, the appearances "standard" creates uncertainty and causes
unwarranted concern over conduct which is consistent with the
letter and spirit of the rules of conduct.
IV. THE EFFECT OF ETHICS OPINIONS ON ATTORNEY
BEHAVIOR
If an attorney recognizes an ethical issue, the attorney
presumably will turn first to the Rules of Professional Conduct. If
the attorney does not find the answer in the rules, the attorney
might attempt to find the answer in the KBA Ethics Opinions - a
difficult task since the opinions are not compiled or indexed in a
common source. If the attorney is aware of the Ethics Committee's
hot-line service, the attorney might call a hot-line member and
"run it by" that member. The hot-line member would consult the
rules and ethics opinions and opine whether the contemplated
conduct is "ethical" or not. An attorney who follows the advice is
thereby shielded from discipline - but not from other adverse
consequences, notably disqualification.
This description of the process exposes a number of flaws: 1)
no compilation or indexing of ethics and unauthorized practice
opinions; 2) different answers by different hot-line members
(though Professor Underwood checks hot-line responses that are
copied to him); and 3) the limited protection afforded to one who
follows the advice of a hot-line member.
84. LoveU, 941 S.W.2d at 468-69 (emphasis added).
85. But see Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Marcum, 830 S.W.2d 839 (Ky. 1992) (discussing
violation of specific rule; appearance of impropriety language also used).
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The major flaw in the process, however, is more subtle.
Formal ethics opinions are advisory only. They do not operate as
rules and one cannot be disciplined for violation of an ethics
opinion. However, most formal opinions have been written in
terms which grant ("may") or deny ("may not") permission.
Inquiring attorneys and ethics committee members tend to think
of the opinions as equal in authority to court rules. The result is,
that when known, the opinions tend to shape conduct to the same
degree as the rules. Attorneys are afraid to engage in conduct
when told by the Ethics Committee and Board of Governors that
they may not engage in such conduct.
There is scant evidence, however, that the Supreme Court of
Kentucky looks to ethics opinions in disciplinary cases. In recent
years, only Kentucky Bar Association v. Geisler8 6 cited an ethics
opinion, and the opinion relied on in Geisler was an opinion of the
American Bar Association, not the KBA.8 7 That is not to say that
the court might not cite an ethics opinion as support, or even adopt
the reasoning of an ethics opinion. In Geisler, the attorney was
charged with violation of Rule 4.188 for settling a case without
telling her opponent that her client had died.89 In ABA Formal
Opinion 95-397,90 the ABA Committee had opined that failing to
make such disclosure amounted to a false statement of material
fact.91 The court in Geisler relied on the opinion, not as the source
of authority, but rather for its reasoning.92
Geisler can be compared to In re A,93 in which the Oregon
Supreme Court declined to discipline an attorney who failed to
disclose the death of his client.94 The Oregon court looked at the
Disciplinary Rules, and ABA and Oregon ethics opinions
construing the rules, and concluded that disciplining the attorney
86. 938 S.W.2d 578 (Ky. 1997).
87. Id. at 579 (The attorney in Geisler did not tell her opponent that her client had
died; the court relied on ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 95-397 (1995) in publicly reprimanding the attorney). "
88. KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.130(4.1) (Banks-Baldwin 1997) (stating "In the course of
representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of material
fact or law to a third person.")
89. Geisler, 938 S.W.2d at 579.
90. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-397 (1995).
91. Id.
92. Id. (This opinion was issued after the relevant facts in Geisler.)
93. 554 P.2d 479 (Or. 1976).
94. Id. at 481 (During a deposition the client said his mother was in Salem, but
neglected to say she was buried in Salem).
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would be unfair, since there was substantial disagreement over
the proper course of conduct.95
Ethics and unauthorized practice opinions which interpret
rules should be respected as persuasive - though non-binding -
interpretations. The appropriate caveat to such an opinion might
be, "We believe the rule should be interpreted to allow (or disallow
as the case may be) the following conduct." That differs, of course,
from the language which has been generally used, "May a lawyer
engage in the contemplated conduct?" Answer "yes" or "no". The
"no" response implies that discipline will be imposed for a violation
of the opinion (not the rule supporting the opinion). On occasion,
the committee has flatly stated that conduct violates the Rules of
Professional Conduct. 96
For example, take the issue of interviewing employees of an
organization without the consent of the organization's lawyer. In
Shoney's, Inc. v. Lewis,97 the court directed the trial court to
disqualify an attorney who had taken statements from a
restaurant's manager prior to filing a sexual harassment action.98
The attorney took the statements knowing that the restaurant
was represented by counsel in the matter and without the consent
of that counsel.99 The court disqualified counsel and ordered the
managers' statements suppressed. 100 The rule applied by the court
in Shoney's was Rule 4.2, stating that a lawyer shall not
knowingly communicate with a represented party without the
consent of that party's counsel. 101 In finding that Lee's managers
were represented parties, the court turned to the Official
Comment to Rule 4.2, which says that the Rule prohibits
communications with persons having a managerial responsibility
on behalf of an organization.10 2 The court further found that the
prohibition applied prior to the filing of suit; i.e., that the 'word
"party" in Rule 4.2 does not imply that the rule is limited to
situations in which one has become a "party" by the filing of
95. Id. at 487.
96. Advisory Ethics Opinion E-356, 57 KY. BENCH & B. 43, 47-48 (Summer 1993).
97. 875 S.W.2d 514 (Ky. 1994).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 514-15.
100. Id. at 516.
101. Ky. Sup. CT. R. 3.130(4.2) (Banks-Baldwin 1997).




In E-38110 4 and E-38210 5 the Committee answered the
following questions: 1) May a lawyer communicate with a former
employee of an organization without the consent of the
organization's lawyer? (Answer: Yes); 2) May a lawyer
communicate with a manager without the consent of the
organization's lawyer? (Answer: No, citing Shoney's);106 3) May a
lawyer communicate with a non-manager employee whose acts or
omissions in connection with a matter cannot be imputed to the
organization and whose statements about the matter will not
constitute an admission of the organization? (Answer: Yes); 4)
May a lawyer communicate with a non-manager employee whose
acts or omissions in connection with a matter may be imputed to
the organization or whose statements about a matter may be
admissible against the organization? (Answer: No).
The first question, answered by E-381, is consistent with the
logic and language of Rule 4.2, but was not decided by the court in
Shoney's. The second question was answered by the court in
Shoney's. The opinion merely restates the rule from that decision.
The third and fourth questions and answers were taken from the
same comment relied on by the court in Shoney's. The opinion
serves, therefore, as a good prediction of what the court would do
in the first, third and fourth situations. There are contrary views,
however, 0 7 and it is far from clear whether the court would adopt
the position of E-381 and E-382. The court might extend the no-
contact rule to all employees, or on the other hand, it might limit
Shoney's to employees of managerial status. Further, the court
might reject E-381 and hold that former employees, as well as
current employees, are off-limits.
The point is that E-381 and E-382 are reasonable predictions of
what the court would do in an appropriate case; they do not
establish rules which bind the court. The only way in which the
court might deem that it is bound by E-381 and E-382 is that a
lawyer who acts in reliance on those opinions (for example by
103. In 1995, the ABA House of Delegates substituted "person" for "party" in ABA
Model Rule 4.2 to make it clear that the no-contact rule does not require that the
represented person be a "party" to litigation. HANDBOOK, supra note 68, at 199.
104. Advisory Ethics Opinion E-381, 59 KY. BENCH & B. 43, 44 (Fall 1995).
105. Advisory Ethics Opinion E-382, 59 KY. BENCH & B. 43, 44-45 (Fall 1995).
106. Shoney's, Inc. v. Lewis, 875 S.W.2d 514 (Ky. 1994).
107. HANDBOOK, supra note 68, at 203-07.
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interviewing a former employee in reliance on E-381) should have
a due process defense to disciplinary charges even if the court
disagrees with the ethics opinion relied on. 108
E-381 and E-382 are reasonable interpretations of Rule 4.2.
Occasionally, however, an opinion purports to establish new rules
of conduct. The best recent example is E-380,109 which interprets
Rule 1.5110 (the rule which requires that fees be reasonable) as
permitting a lawyer to designate a fee as a "non-refundable
retainer" so long as the overall fee is reasonable."' The opinion
goes on to say, however, that for the retainer to be "valid" the
arrangement must be in writing and state the time frame in which
the arrangement exists.'1 2 By purporting to impose a writing
requirement, E-380 goes beyond that which is required by Rule
1.5.113 It can be predicted that a client will rely on E-380 and sue
for return of a non-refundable retainer on the ground that the
agreement, not being in writing, is unenforceable.
Similarly, in E-379114 the Committee opined that a lawyer may
not report a non-paying client to a credit bureau. 15  The
Committee relied on an Alaska opinion which stated that referral
to a credit bureau would result in unauthorized disclosure of
confidential information. 1 6 The Committee contrasted referrals to
a collection agency, which are directly related to the collection of a
fee and are thus permissible." 7 The Committee's reasoning is
defensible but the distinction is subtle and the conclusion - that it
is unethical to report a non-paying client to a credit bureau - is
not obvious. An attorney unaware of E-379 might innocently turn
over delinquent accounts to a credit bureau.
Many ethics opinions speak to relationships between lawyers
and identified groups. Some opinions reach non-obvious
108. Cf. Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. An Unnamed Attorney, 769 S.W.2d 45 (Ky. 1989)
(explaining that attorney had a right to rely on reported case, even though case was
wrongly decided; no discipline imposed).
109. Advisory Ethics Opinion E-380, 59 KY. BENCH & B. 43, 43-44 (Fall 1995).
110. Ky. Sup. Ct. R. 3.130(1.5) (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
111. Advisory Ethics Opinion E-380, 59 KY. BENCH & B. 43, 43-44 (Fall 1995).
112. Id.
113. Ky. Sup. CT. R. 3.130(1.5) (Banks-Baldwin 1997) (requiring only that contingent
fee arrangements be in writing).
114. Advisory Ethics Opinion E-379, 59 KY. BENCH & B. 53, 56 (Summer 1995).
115. Id.





- Attorneys and charities: E-388 - an attorney may not
advertise that he will donate a portion of his fee to the
client's favorite charity; rules cited: 5.4 (sharing fees with a
non-lawyer) and 7.20 (giving something of value to
someone for recommending the lawyer).118 E-391 - an
attorney may not enter into an agreement with a charity
whereby he charges a reduced fee for estate planning
services to persons making bequests to the charity; rule
cited: 7.20 (giving something of value to someone for
recommending the lawyer). 1 9
- Attorneys and other professionals. E-390 - an attorney
may not accept a referral fee from an investment counselor;
rules cited: 1.7 (conflicts), 1.8 (business relations with
client), 2.1 (attorney as independent advisor), and 5.4
(sharing fees with non-lawyer);1 20 E-367 - an attorney
may not offer gifts to realtors to encourage the realtors to
refer clients to him; rule cited: 7.20(2) (offering something
of value to a non-lawyer for recommending the lawyer's
services). 121
- Attorneys and insurance companies: E-378 - an
attorney may not defend both an insured in a personal
injury action and the insurer sued under the Unfair Claims
Settlement Practices statute;1 22 rules cited: 1.2 (obligation
to client), 1.6 (client confidences), 1.7 (confficts), and 1.8
(payment by third party);123 E-368 - an attorney may not
enter into an arrangement with a liability insurer whereby
the attorney agrees to handle all of the liability claims
against insureds for a set fee; rules cited: 1.7 (conflicts) and
1.8 (payment by third party). 124
- Attorneys and unions: E-358 - an attorney may not
pay for union officials' meals or lodging or pay to become
118. Advisory Ethics Opinion E-388, 60 KY. BENCH & B. 56 (Summer 1996).
119. Advisory Ethics Opinion E-391, 60 KY. BENCH & B. 45, 45-46 (Fall 1996).
120. Advisory Ethics Opinion E-390, 60 KY. BENCH & B. 45, 45 (Fall 1996).
121. Advisory Ethics Opinion E-367, 58 KY. BENCH & B. 40, 41 (Summer 1994).
122. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.12-230 (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
123. Advisory Ethics Opinion E-378, 59 KY. BENCH & B. 53, 55 (Summer 1995).
124. Advisory Ethics Opinion E-368, 58 KY. BENCH & B. 52, 52-53 (Fall 1994), opinion
aff'd, American Ins. Co. v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 917 S.W.2d 568 (Ky. 1996).
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members of a Designated Counsel Group; 125 rule cited:
7.20(2) (giving something of value to a non-lawyer to
recommend the lawyer's services).
To the extent that attorneys aware of these opinions treat them as
rules, the opinions shape attorney behavior. To the extent that
attorneys are unaware of the opinions, the opinions serve as
potential traps which might snare an attorney who engages in
behavior "prohibited" by the opinions.
V. THE EFFECT OF UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OPINIONS
The UPL Committee interprets Kentucky Supreme Court Rule
3.020, which states that: "The practice of law is any service
rendered involving legal knowledge or legal advice, whether of
representation, counsel, or advocacy in or out of court, rendered in
respect to the rights, duties, obligations, liabilities, or business
relations of one requiring the services.' 126 This is a sweeping
definition, which, if applied broadly, would subject CPAs, financial
advisors, real estate salesman, trust officers, and others to charges
of unauthorized practice. 127 However, UPL opinions by and large
are applications of two Kentucky cases: Frazee v. Citizens Fidelity
Bank128 and Kentucky State Bar Association v. Henry Vogt
Machine Company, Inc.129
Henry Vogt is the easier case to understand and apply. In that
case, Henry Vogt's personnel director questioned witnesses and
made arguments in an administrative hearing. 130 The court held
such activity to be the practice of law.1'1 Henry Vogt stands for the
proposition that any activity on behalf of a client in a judicial or
quasi-judicial hearing is the practice of law.
In Frazee, contempt citations were sought against five trust
125. Advisory Ethics Opinion E-358, 57 KY. BENCH & B. 43, 48-49 (Summer 1993).
126. Ky. Sup. Gr. R. 3.020 (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
127. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 524.130 (Banks-Baldwin 1997) (making the unauthorized
practice of law a Class B misdemeanor; unauthorized practice cases more commonly
reach the high court on citations brought by the Kentucky Bar Association charging the
"practitioners" with contempt of the Supreme Court by willfully disobeying its rules
against unauthorized practice).
128. 393 S.W.2d 778 (Ky. 1965); Frazee builds on Hobson v. Kentucky Trust Co., 197
S.W.2d 454 (Ky. 1946).





companies for their activities in preparing wills and trusts and
administering trusts and estates. 132 Starting from the position
that a corporation cannot practice law, the court examined the
defendants' activities and declared off-limits activities involving
interpretation of the law, drafting of pleadings, court appearances,
and drafting of legal documents. 13 3 Other trust activities -
twenty-eight enumerated items - were approved. 134 In Frazee,
the court attempted to deprive trust companies of all but their
ministerial and business activities.
Applying Henry Vogt, the UPL Committee has forbidden
laymen from representing others in a number of trial like
hearings: civil service commissions,135 Board of Tax Appeals, 136
faculty and student grievance committees,' 37 Board of Claims, 138
zoning boards, 39 and Department of Workers' Claims. 140 In the
opinion declaring lay representation before the Department of
Worker Claims to be the unauthorized practice of law, the UPL
Committee recognized that the General Assembly had authorized
lay representation of injured workers. 141 Relying on Section 116 of
the Constitution, Henry Vogt, and its own opinions, the Committee
declared lay representation to be the unauthorized practice of law,
notwithstanding its approval by the legislature. 142
Frazee has proved more difficult to' apply. While
acknowledging that preparation of tax returns involves legal
advice and legal instruments, the UPL Committee recognized that
it was impractical to declare such to be the practice of law.143 The
Committee declared the pension and profit sharing field to be the
practice of law,' 44 but approved real estate agents' completion of
132. Frazee, 393 S.W.2d at 781.
133. Id. at 784.
134. Id.
135. U-12 (1975), DESKBOOK, supra note 9, at 11-16.
136. U-17 (1977), DESKBOOK, supra note 9, at 11-21.
137. U-34 (1981), DESKBOOK, supra note 8, at 11-43.
138. U-35 (1981), DESKBOOK, supra note 8, at 11-46.
139. U-43 (1989), DESKBOOK, supra note 8, at 11-57.
140. U-52, 61 KY. BENCH & B. 55 (Summer 1997).
141. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.320(9) (Banks-Baldwin 1997) "Notwithstanding any
provisions of law to the contrary, the provisions of this chapter shall not be construed or
interpreted to prohibit non-attorney representation of injured workers covered by this
chapter."
142. U-52, 61 Ky. BENCH & B. 55 (Summer 1997).
143. U-25 (1979), DESKBOOK, supra note 8, at 11-30.
144. U-32 (1981), DESKBOOK, supra note 9 11-37.
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purchase contracts and other documents.145 In 1981, the
Committee approved real estate closings by laymen, 146 but in 1997
the Board of Governors considered (but later rejected) an opinion
that would require a lawyer at closings.147
VI. ANTI-TRUST IMPLICATIONS
Some ethics and unauthorized practice opinions might be
viewed as anti-competitive and in restraint of trade. 48 In
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,149 the United States Supreme
Court held that the Virginia State Bar Association violated the
Sherman Antitrust Act. 50 The State Bar Association had stated
that it was unethical to cut fees, which caused Fairfax County
lawyers to refuse to do a title examination for less than the
minimum fee set by the defendant, Fairfax County Bar
Association. 151 The Court rejected the bar associations' contention
that they were agents of the state of Virginia and were therefore
not subject to the Sherman Act. 152 The Court pointed out that the
Virginia Supreme Court had not mandated minimum fee
schedules; to the contrary the court had declared that a lawyer
should not permit himself to be controlled by a minimum fee
schedule. 153 While the Virginia Supreme Court had granted the
State Bar the authority to issue ethical opinions, there was no
indication that the Virginia Supreme Court approved the content
of the opinions. 154  In order to qualify for the state-action
exemption, the Court said it was not enough that the "anti-
competitive conduct is prompted by state action; rather anti-
competitive activities must be compelled by the State acting as
sovereign."155
Two years later the Supreme Court decided Bates v. State Bar
145. U-41 (1986), DESKBOOK, supra note 9, at 11-55.
146. U-31 (1981), DESKBOOK, supra note 9, at 11-36.
147. John Cheves, State Bar Considers Requiring Lawyers at Closings, LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER, Sept. 13, 1997, at Cl.
148. Little and Rush, supra note 58, at 356.
149. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 777-78.
152. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (explaining that the Sherman Act was not
intended to apply to state action).
153. 421 U.S. at 789.




of Arizona.156 While famous as the case which extended First
Amendment protection to attorney advertising, Bates is also an
anti-trust case. The Court held that the Arizona State Bar was
entitled to the state-action exemption because, in prosecuting
Bates and O'Steen for ethical violations, the Bar was acting as the
Arizona court's agent, enforcing a rule adopted by the court.15
In California Retail Liquor Dealer's Association v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc. 58 the Court held that wine "fair trade" contracts,
established pursuant to California's price-fixing statute, were not
entitled to the state-action exemption. 59 The Court set down a
two-part test for the exemption: 1) the restraint must reflect state
policy; and 2) the state must actively enforce the restraint.160 The
Court held that the fair trade contracts passed the first part of the
test, since the California legislature clearly intended wine
producers to be able to control retail prices, but that the program
flunked the second part of the test, since the state took no active
role in setting prices. 61 Making the courts available to private
enforcement actions did not, said the Court, constitute active
supervision.162
In Hoover v. Ronwin,163 the Court applied Goldfarb, Bates and
Midcal to state bar examiners, appointed by the Arizona Supreme
Court and authorized by that court to administer and grade the
state bar examination. 164 The Court held that Bates controlled
and the examiners were entitled to the state-action exemption. 65
The Arizona Supreme Court had authorized the bar examination
process and had the ultimate say in passing on candidates'
applications for admission.
In a 1981 article, Professors Little and Rush analyzed the
antitrust implications of state ethics opinions. 66 They opined that
the potential for antitrust liability could be minimized by steps to
156. 433 U.S. 350 (1977), reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977).
157. Id. at 360 (Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B); the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility had been adopted in Arizona by court rule).
158. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
159. Id. at 113-14.
160. Id. at 105.
161. Id. at 105-06.
162. Id.
163. 466 U.S. 558, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1268 (1984).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 572.
166. Little & Rush, supra note 58.
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satisfy the two-part Midcal test. 167 They suggested: 1) having the
state supreme court appoint the members of the ethics committee;
2) providing for review of ethics opinions by the state supreme
court on petition of an aggrieved member of the bar, a bar
association, or the ethics committee itself; and 3) providing that
ethics opinions be binding on the committee.1 68 In Bates and
Hoover, the state supreme court both set policy and actively
supervised the complainea-of activities.16 9 Clearly, the closer the
ties between the ethics committee and the state supreme court, the
more likely it is that the activities of the committee will fall within
the state-action exemption.170
The activities of the Kentucky Ethics and UPL Committees fall
within the state-action exemption. There are several reasons for
this. First, Section 116 of the Kentucky Constitution gives the
supreme court plenary power over rules of procedure and attorney
discipline. Second, the court adopted the procedural rule creating
the Ethics and UPL Committees. Third, the court has declared
that the KBA (which appoints the committee members) "exists
solely by virtue of rules of this court ... [and] their accountability
is to this court only, of which they are an integral part."'71 Fourth,
aggrieved persons have a right to appeal an adverse decision of the
Ethics or UPL Committee to the supreme court. Thus, the
Kentucky process appears to be within the state-action exemption
as exemplified by the Bates and Hoover decisions. On the other
hand, direct appointment of committee members by the court
would remove all doubt on this issue.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
1) By court rule, ethics opinions are advisory. Therefore, in
disapproving conduct the Ethics Committee and the UPL
Committee should use words of caution rather than words denying
167. Id.
168. Id. at 368-69.
169. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558,
reh'q denied, 467 U.S. 1268 (1984)..
170. Kentucky has a "little Sherman Act." Kentucky Revised Statutes section 367.175
has been given the same construction as the Sherman Act. Mendell v. Golden-Farley of
Hopkinsville, Inc., 573 S.W.2d 346 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). Presumably the courts would
construe the statute as not intended to apply to state action.




permission. While lawyers who choose to adhere to the opinions'
advice should be shielded from discipline, lawyers (and others)
who choose otherwise cannot be disciplined for "violation of an
opinion."
Questions posed as they were in E-3531 v2 reflect the proper role
of ethics opinions - to approve conduct and to caution against, but
not prohibit, conduct. In E-353, the questions were framed as
follows:
1) Should a lawyer who represents the Transportation
Cabinet (under contract, retainer, or otherwise) at the
same time represent another client against the
Transportation Cabinet? Answer: "No."
3) May a lawyer who represents the Transportation
Cabinet (under contract, retainer, or otherwise) represent a
client against another agency of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky (i.e. The Revenue Cabinet)? Answer: "Yes."'173
The answers to the posed questions thus cautioned lawyers
against the conduct described in the first question but approved
the conduct described in the third question. 174 Opinions approving
conduct should bear the caveat that courts are not obligated to
follow ethics opinions in non-disciplinary contexts.
2) Under the present rule, ethics and UPL opinions are not
released as formal opinions without the affirmative vote of three
fourths of the Board of Governors. 175 Therefore, formal opinions
should reflect the action of the Board of Governors. They should
be prefaced with the statement that the opinion was "approved
without change," or "modified," as the case may be. The Board
should also use cautionary and permissive language, rather than
172. Advisoiy Ethics Opinion E-353, 57 KY. BENCH & B. 43, 43-45 (Summer 1993); cf.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 97-405 (1997)
(applying Rule 1.7 to representation of governmental clients; suggestions for
identification of the "client" for conflict purposes).
173. Id.
174. In the body of the opinion, however, the Committee used mandatory language in
discussing the conduct which was the subject of the first question.
Turning to the specific questions, we note that in KBA E-281 (1984) ....
decided under the Code, the Committee opined that a private lawyer
representing a state agency on a personal service contract could not
represent a private client against the same agency in a different,
unrelated matter. This view is consistent with the Rules, and to this
extent we see no reason to depart from E-281.
Id.
175. KY. SUP. CT. R. 3.530(2) (Banks-Baldwin 1997).
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words of prohibition ("may not").
3) Supreme Court Rule 3.530 should be amended to provide
that the Kentucky Supreme Court appoints the members of the
Ethics and UPL committees. That would make it clear beyond
doubt that those who serve on those committees are within the
state-action exemption.
4) Supreme Court Rule 3.530 should be amended to provide for
the Kentucky Supreme Court to review formal opinions on the
court's own motion, as well as on appeal by an aggrieved party. If
the court should decline review, the opinion would be published in
the Kentucky Bench and Bar as an advisory opinion of the Ethics
Committee or UPL Committee, and the Board of Governors. If the
court accepted review it could affirm, modify, or republish the
opinion as it saw fit. An ethics opinion of the court would appear
in the Southwestern Reporter, and would have the same effect as a
rule of court. Clearly separating the advisory (opinions of the
committees and board) from the mandatory (opinions of the court)
would accomplish the following:
- adequate notice to attorneys of mandatory (court)
opinions;
- minimize the regulatory effect of advisory opinions;
- bring the advisory opinion system clearly within the
state-action exemption to the anti-trust laws;
- give the court the means to review negative opinions in
situations where no person feels sufficiently aggrieved to
take an appeal;
- give the court the means to review permissive ("you
may") opinions in cases where the court feels the
Committee was wrong.
It is entirely consistent with the court's role as promulgator of
rules and regulator of the profession for the court to have the
power to review ethics opinions sua sponte.
5) The court should quit citing Rule 1.4 as a basis for
discipline, since that rule does not purport to require
communication. The court should cease and desist from further
use of the term "appearance of impropriety," since an appearances
standard does not adequately advise attorneys of what is
impermissible conduct.
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